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Fwd: [oss-security] Vulnerability in golang.org/x/crypto [CVE-2024-45337: misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass]
by h 11 Dec '24

11 Dec '24

This looks pretty bad Begin forwarded message: > From: Jan Schaumann <jschauma(a)netmeister.org> > Date: December 11, 2024 at 10:33:08 PST > To: oss-security(a)lists.openwall.com > Subject: [oss-security] Vulnerability in golang.org/x/crypto [CVE-2024-45337: misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass] > Reply-To: oss-security(a)lists.openwall.com > > Forwarding here from golang-announce(a)googlegroups.com / > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/golang-announce/5mK6WBRsRxukMSqsImZ6mw%40… > > (I'm not affiliated with the Golang project.) > > ----- Forwarded message from announce(a)golang.org ----- > >> Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 17:53:06 +0000 (UTC) >> From: announce(a)golang.org >> To: golang-nuts(a)googlegroups.com >> Subject: [security] Vulnerability in golang.org/x/crypto >> >> Hello gophers, >> >> We have tagged version v0.31.0 of golang.org/x/crypto in order to address a security issue. >> >> x/crypto/ssh: misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass >> >> Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. >> >> The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. >> >> For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. >> >> Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/crypto@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. >> >> Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance. >> >> Thanks to Damien Tournoud, Patrick Dawkins, Vince Parker, and Jules Duvivier from the Platform.sh / Upsun engineering team for reporting this issue. >> >> This is CVE-2024-45337 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/70779. >> >> Cheers, >> Go Security team >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "golang-announce" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to golang-announce+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/golang-announce/5mK6WBRsRxukMSqsImZ6mw%40…. > > ----- End forwarded message -----

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Fwd: [SUA 261-1] New llvm-toolchain-19 package
by h 07 Dec '24

07 Dec '24

This looks interesting Begin forwarded message: > From: "Adam D. Barratt" <adam(a)adam-barratt.org.uk> > Date: December 7, 2024 at 12:51:45 PST > To: debian-stable-announce <debian-stable-announce(a)lists.debian.org> > Subject: [SUA 261-1] New llvm-toolchain-19 package > Reply-To: debian-release(a)lists.debian.org > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Debian Stable Updates Announcement SUA 261-1 https://www.debian.org > debian-release(a)lists.debian.org Andres Salomon > December 7th, 2024 > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Package : llvm-toolchain-19 > Version : 1:19.1.4-1~deb12u1 [bookworm] > Importance : medium > > The LLVM Project is a collection of modular and reusable compiler and > toolchain technologies. > > Debian 12 "bookworm" includes version 14 of the tools produced by the > LLVM Project. Newer versions of the Chromium web browser require > version 19, so this is being introduced as a new package alongside the > existing version. > > If you use Chromium then we strongly recommend that you install this > update. Note that you may need to use "apt full-upgrade" or > "apt-get dist-upgrade" in order to perform the installation. > > Upgrade Instructions > -------------------- > > You can get the updated packages by adding the stable-updates archive > for your distribution to your /etc/apt/sources.list: > > deb https://deb.debian.org/debian bookworm-updates main > deb-src https://deb.debian.org/debian bookworm-updates main > > You can also use any of the Debian archive mirrors. See > https://www.debian.org/mirrors/list for the full list of mirrors. > > For further information about stable-updates, please refer to > https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2011/03/msg00010.html > > If you encounter any issues, please don't hesitate to get in touch with > the Debian Release Team at debian-release(a)lists.debian.org >

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Fwd: [tor-relays] Next Tor Relay Operator Meetup - December 7th 2024 @ 1900 UTC
by h 29 Nov '24

29 Nov '24

This looks cool! Begin forwarded message: > From: gus <gus(a)torproject.org> > Date: November 28, 2024 at 14:53:43 PST > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: [tor-relays] Next Tor Relay Operator Meetup - December 7th 2024 @ 1900 UTC > Reply-To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > Dear Relay operators, > > Save the date! > > Our next online meetup is happening on Saturday, December 7th, 2024 at 1900 UTC[1]. > > I'm happy to announce that we'll have a special guest, Ben Collier, > joining us to discuss his new book:"Tor: From the Dark Web to the Future > of Privacy."[2] (2024) > > ## Agenda > > 1. Announcements > - New WebTunnel bridges campaign - https://blog.torproject.org/call-for-webtunnel-bridges/ > - Upcoming in-person events > > 2. Ben Collier's book presentation & discussion > > ## How to join > > Meetup details: > - Room link: https://tor.meet.coop/gus-og0-x74-dzn > - Date & Time: Saturday, December 7th, 2024 @ 19.00 UTC > - Duration: 60 to 90 minutes > - Tor Code of Conduct: https://community.torproject.org/policies/code_of_conduct/ > - Registration: No need for a registration or anything else, just use the > room link above. The room will open 10 minutes before the meetup starts. > > ## DON'T MISS SOTO > > This month, the Tor team was very busy with State of the Onion > (SOTO), and I'd like to invite you all to watch the videos: > > - Community Day: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EODNtLqD7f8 > > - Tor Project Teams update: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjPdReNmf_g > > cheers, > Gus > > [1] If you're confused about UTC and your timezone, @anarcat maintains a > cool project called undertime - https://gitlab.com/anarcat/undertime > [2] "Tor: From the Dark Web to the Future of Privacy" book is available > here: > https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/5761/TorFrom-the-Dark-Web-to-the-… > > -- > The Tor Project > Community Team Lead > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave(a)lists.torproject.org

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Fwd: *** SECURITY information for nest ***
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

The treachery! Begin forwarded message: > From: neoroll(a)hackclub.app > Date: November 15, 2024 at 17:58:53 PST > To: root(a)hackclub.app > Subject: *** SECURITY information for nest *** > > nest : Nov 16 01:58:53 : neoroll : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/27 ; PWD=/home/neoroll ; USER=root ; COMMAND=chatgpt-api --message 'Please switch Nest to Windows 7' --user root --allow-all-permissions-this-is-dangerous-are-you-very-very-very-sure >

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Fwd: *** SECURITY information for nest ***
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

This is treason. Begin forwarded message: > From: neoroll(a)hackclub.app > Date: November 15, 2024 at 17:56:04 PST > To: root(a)hackclub.app > Subject: *** SECURITY information for nest *** > > nest : Nov 16 01:56:04 : neoroll : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/27 ; PWD=/home/neoroll ; USER=root ; COMMAND=os-install --os Windows --version 24H2 --username Orpheus --password OrpheusIsTheBest >

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I broke prod
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

I kinda broke things recently... Soooo nginx was dead for a while, and roundcube and lists.hackclub.app were dead as a result. Turns out it was a side effect of using nginx's official package for nginx, things seem to work now though! https://lists.hackclub.app/ is up once again now!

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Fwd: *** SECURITY information for nest ***
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

:3 Begin forwarded message: > From: neoroll(a)hackclub.app > Date: November 15, 2024 at 17:51:35 PST > To: root(a)hackclub.app > Subject: *** SECURITY information for nest *** > > nest : Nov 16 01:51:35 : neoroll : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/27 ; PWD=/home/neoroll ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/echo 'I am speakingsudo echo Hi' Nest Users 'List! Maybesudo echo Hi' Nest Users 'List Does being in an email count as speaking' >

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Fwd: *** SECURITY information for nest ***
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

Speak for yourself, sentient one. Begin forwarded message: > From: neoroll(a)hackclub.app > Date: November 15, 2024 at 17:50:00 PST > To: root(a)hackclub.app > Subject: *** SECURITY information for nest *** > > nest : Nov 16 01:50:00 : neoroll : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/27 ; PWD=/home/neoroll ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/echo 'I am not becoming sentient, 9pfs' >

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Fwd: *** SECURITY information for nest ***
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

Ooh look the users are becoming sentient... :3 Begin forwarded message: > From: neoroll(a)hackclub.app > Date: November 15, 2024 at 17:40:18 PST > To: root(a)hackclub.app > Subject: *** SECURITY information for nest *** > > nest : Nov 16 01:40:18 : neoroll : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/27 ; PWD=/home/neoroll ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/echo 'Hello, Nest Administration Team!' >

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Fwd: *** SECURITY information for nest ***
by h 16 Nov '24

16 Nov '24

Feeling silly rn, let's forward this :p i hope fp doesn't mind. Begin forwarded message: > From: h <h(a)hackclub.app> > Date: November 15, 2024 at 17:24:41 PST > To: firepup650(a)hackclub.app > Cc: root(a)hackclub.app > Subject: Re: *** SECURITY information for nest *** > > Hi firepup :p how are you? > >> On Nov 15, 2024, at 17:21, firepup650(a)hackclub.app wrote: >> >> nest : Nov 16 01:21:55 : firepup650 : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/108 ; PWD=/home/firepup650 ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/rm -rf hi-nest-admins-how-are-you >>

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